Under the UK Strong Customer Authentication and Common and Secure Methods of Communication technical standards (UK SCA-RTS, made under the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs 2017)), an account servicing payment service provider (ASPSP) that offers payment accounts accessible online must give authorised third-party providers (TPPs) a secure access route. Where that route is a dedicated interface (an API), the ASPSP must also have a contingency mechanism — a fallback that authorised TPPs can use if the dedicated interface becomes unavailable or stops performing — unless the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has granted an exemption under UK SCA-RTS Article 33(6).

This page describes the UK contingency mechanism for accounts held with Klarna Financial Services UK Ltd (KFSUK), accessed through KFSUK's dedicated Open Banking interface. It is the UK counterpart to Klarna Bank AB's EU PSD2 contingency mechanism; the EU page does not apply to UK accounts, and this page does not apply to EU accounts held with Klarna Bank AB.

This contingency mechanism applies to account information and payment initiation services in respect of UK payment accounts held with KFSUK. It does not extend to other Klarna products or payment methods, nor to accounts held with Klarna Bank AB, which are accessible only via the separate EU dedicated XS2A interface.

KFSUK's contingency mechanism is the customer-facing online banking interface — the same interface a UK customer uses to access and manage their account — adapted so that authorised TPPs can identify themselves and use it.

If the dedicated interface is unavailable, an authorised TPP may access the account information or initiate the payment it needs through this online banking interface, identifying itself as a TPP, until the dedicated interface is restored. This is the fallback foreseen by UK SCA-RTS Article 33(4).

The fallback is intended only for the situations described in UK SCA-RTS Article 33 — it is not an alternative route for normal traffic. It may be used when the dedicated interface:

• does not perform in line with the availability and performance requirements of UK SCA-RTS Article 32 (for example, repeated errors or excessive response times), or
• is subject to unplanned unavailability or a systems breakdown.

In line with UK SCA-RTS Article 33(1), unavailability or breakdown is presumed when five consecutive requests for access are not answered within 30 seconds. Once the dedicated interface is restored, TPPs must return to using it.

When using the online banking interface as a fallback, the TPP must:

1. Identify itself with its UK eIDAS-equivalent certificate. UK-authorised TPPs authenticate with the certificates recognised in the UK — an OBWAC transport certificate and, where relevant, an OBSEAL signing certificate (issued under the Open Banking trust framework). EU eIDAS certificates are not accepted on the UK interface. The fallback is not anonymous access.
2. Rely on Klarna's customer authentication (Strong Customer Authentication) and not modify or interfere with the online banking interface. Strong Customer Authentication continues to apply through the fallback interface.
3. Justify the use of the fallback to Klarna. When a TPP uses the contingency mechanism, it must inform KFSUK and justify why it used the fallback instead of the dedicated interface (i.e. that the dedicated interface was unavailable or not performing) by email to support.xs2a.banking@klarna.com. This reflects the TPP's obligation to inform the ASPSP when it makes use of the fallback (UK SCA-RTS Article 33(5)(e)); the TPP must also be able to justify the use to the FCA on request (Article 33(5)(d)).
4. Comply with all applicable obligations under UK SCA-RTS Article 33(5). In particular, when using the fallback the TPP must: (a) not access, store or process data beyond what is strictly necessary to provide the service requested by the payment service user (Article 33(5)(a)); (b) continue to comply with its obligations under the PSRs 2017 corresponding to Article 66(3) (for PISPs) and Article 67(2) (for AISPs) of PSD2 (Article 33(5)(b)); and (c) log all data accessed through the fallback interface and provide those logs to the FCA on request and without undue delay (Article 33(5)(c)).

The TPP must be authorised or registered by the FCA for the relevant service (AIS, PIS or CBPII) and identifiable on the FCA register / UK Open Banking Directory. No separate contract or commercial agreement is required to use the fallback — access is available to every authorised TPP on the same basis as the dedicated interface (UK SCA-RTS Article 30(1)).

KFSUK monitors the availability and performance of the dedicated interface, publishes the required service-level statistics, and notifies TPPs of planned downtime and of major incidents affecting the interface. Problems with the dedicated interface are addressed without undue delay.

Availability, response-time statistics (AIS and PIS), planned maintenance and incident history are published on the Klarna UK Open Banking status page. You can subscribe there to be notified whenever an incident is created, updated or resolved.

For questions about the UK contingency mechanism or interface availability, contact support.xs2a.banking@klarna.com.